International Economics I Foreign Direct Investment (Multinationals)

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- Trade is concentrated in very large firms: export more quantity, more products and to more countries.
  - ▶ In the US the top 1% exporters account for 81% of US exports! (in 2000)
- More importantly, a lot trade is accounted by multinational firms:
  - ▶ 90% of US exports and imports are made by multinationals
  - similar number in other developed countries
- One-half of US imports are transacted within the boundaries of multinational firms!

- **Multinationals:** An enterprise that controls and manages production establishments located in at least two countries.
- It is usually defined by:
  - ▶ the *parent* firm or the *headquarter*, located in the source country,
  - ▶ and the *affiliates*, located in the host country.
- The expansion of multinationals are done basically by foreign direct investment (FDI).
  - "greenfield": set up a new firm abroad
  - "brownfield": invest in existing plants (mergers and acquisitions)

## 1. Data Facts about FDI and Multinationals

## 2. Horizontal FDI

3. Vertical FDI

4. Offshoring, FDI and Licensing/Outsourcing

- features of FDI and MNCs' activities:
  - ► level of development of source and destination country: different patterns
  - which are the sectors with more MNCs activity?
  - which are the characteristics of Multinationals?
  - what do MNCs? subsidiaries do?
  - how much greenfield and brownfield FDI in advanced countries vs LDC?

#### FDI over time



Large increase in FDI inflows over time, mostly to developed countries.

#### Advanced Countries Do More FDI



#### Advanced Countries Receive (Slightly) More FDI

- high FDI inflows and outflows between advanced countries
- developing countries are more likely to receive FDI than to do it



## Sectors and Activity of Multinationals

- where there are MNCs there's intra-firm trade
  - headquarters to subsidiaries and back
- the share of import captured by intra-firm import
  - ▶ is higher in capital and R&D intensive sectors
    - \* intermediate goods for low capital intensive sectors (textiles and shoes) are imported from external firms
    - intermediate goods for high capital intensive sectors (pharmaceuticals and machinery) are imported from a subsidiary
- lots of intra-industry FDI
- higher in capital intensive sectors

## Intra-firm Import and Capital and R&D Intensity



## What Distinguishes Multinationals?

- MNCs' subsidiaries, relative to local firms:
  - are larger (by employment and sales)
  - are more productive
  - invest more in R&D
  - are more export oriented

## What Distinguishes Multinationals?

Percentage accounted by multinational affiliates:

	Finland	France	Ireland	Holland	Poland	Sweden
Enterprises	1.6	2.0	13.4	3.4	16.0	2.8
Employment	17.2	26.2	48.0	25.1	28.1	32.4
Sales	16.2	31.8	81.1	41.1	45.2	39.9
$\rm R\&D$ Expenditure	13.1	27.4	77.3	35.8	20.9	52.0
Exports	17.5	39.5	92.3	60.0	69.1	45.8

Table 1. Affiliates Relative to Local Firms

Source: OECD (2007).

- headquarters specialize in R&D and product design
- subsidiaries:
  - mainly sell in their own markets (horizontal FDI)
  - second, export to other countries (hub for horizontal FDI)
  - third, export back to the US (vertical FDI)

#### What Do US MNCs' Subsidiaries Do?

	Host Country	Other Foreign	United States
Total Manufacturing	55	34	11
Textile and Apparel	45	35	19
Metals and Minerals	60	32	8
Chemicals and Plastics	58	36	6
Machinery	49	36	15
Computers and Electronics	40	43	16
Electronic Equipment	47	40	13
Transport Equipment	47	35	19
Other	66	26	8

Table 2. Destination of Affiliate Sales by Industry

Source: 2009 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, BEA.

• Recall:

- "greenfield": set up a new firm abroad
- "brownfield": invest in existing plants (mergers and acquisitions)
- mergers and acquisitions represent (UNCTAD data for 2007)
  - ▶ 50% of FDI flows at world level
  - ▶ 68% of FDI flows in advanced countries
  - ▶ 18% of FDI flows in LDCs

- Why do some firms find it optimal to operate in more than one country?
- The answer depends on the production activities that the affiliate carry on.

#### • Horizontal FDI:

- Firms replicate the entire production profit in a affiliate to sell in a foreign market.
- ▶ Usually done between similar countries: North-North FDI.
- Vertical FDI:
  - Firms break-up the production in different countries to save cost.
  - Usually done between different countries: North-South FDI.
  - Production sometimes is exported back to headquarter countries.

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- Exporting can be potentially costly: high transportation costs, tariffs, etc.
- Alternative: set up production closer to the consumer base.
  - save the "iceberg costs"!
- Problem: it is costly to set a plant in a new country
  - high fixed cost: new factory, bureaucracy, etc.
  - we lose "scale" (recall increasing returns to scale).
- This is called: proximity-concentration trade-off.

- modeling the alternative to export: horizontal FDI
  - firms settle in the foreign country to produce & sell there
- Extension of Melitz model: Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)
  - ▶ formalize the choice beween export and FDI within the same model
- horizontal FDI entails
  - a fixed cost  $f_I > f_X$  to settle production in the foreign country
  - no additional variable cost (i.e. no au) ightarrow marginal cost 1/arphi

#### Exporters vs Multinationals: Choice

• profits from FDI:

$$\pi_I = A_x \varphi^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} - f_I$$

• profits from export:

$$\pi_X = A_x \left(\varphi/\tau\right)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} - f_X$$

- proximity vs concentration trade-off:
  - multinationals face higher fixed costs, but save transportation costs
  - ▶ a firm chooses FDI rather than exporting when  $\pi_I > \pi_X$
- p.s. we assume that price of factors (i.e. wages) are the same since countries are similar (North-North FDI).

## Multinationals, Exporting and Non-Exporting Firms

• profits from:

domestic sales, export, FDI

$$\pi_D = A\varphi^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} - f_D \qquad \pi_X = A \left(\varphi/\tau\right)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} - f_X$$
$$\pi_I = A\varphi^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} - f_I$$

• firms partition in groups (under the assumption that  $f_I$  is large enough):

- firms with productivity below  $\varphi_D^*$  exit
- firms between  $\varphi_D^*$  and  $\varphi_X^*$  produce in the domestic market only
- firms above  $\varphi_X^*$  export too
- firms above  $\varphi_I^*$  become multinationals

#### Multinationals, Exporting and Non-Exporting Firms



 $\pi_D = A\varphi^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} - f_D \qquad \pi_X = A(\varphi/\tau)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} - f_X \qquad \pi_I = A\varphi^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} - f_I$ 

#### Exporters vs Multinationals: Productivity

- productivity of multinationals, exporters and non-exporters is such that
  - φ<sub>I</sub><sup>\*</sup> > φ<sub>X</sub><sup>\*</sup> > φ<sub>D</sub><sup>\*</sup>
    Helpman et al. (2004) estimate on US data for firms of 52 sectors:

$$\log\left(\frac{Y}{L}\right)_{ij} = \alpha + \beta MNE_{ij} + \gamma EXP_{ij} + controls + \epsilon_{ij}$$

- \*  $(Y/L)_{ij} =$  labor productivity of firm j in sector i
- ★  $MNE_{ij} = 1$  if j is multinational
- ★ control group = non-exporters

\* 
$$\beta \approx \varphi_I - \varphi_D$$
,  $\gamma \approx \varphi_X - \varphi_D$  and  $\beta - \gamma \approx \varphi_I - \varphi_X$ 

#### Exporters vs Multinationals: Productivity

#### TABLE 1—PRODUCTIVITY ADVANTAGE OF MULTINATIONALS AND EXPORTERS

Multinational	0.537
	(14.432)
Nonmultinational exporter	0.388
	(9.535)
Coefficient difference	0.150
	(3.694)
Number of firms	3,202

- Multinationals are 53.7% more productive than non-exporters.
- Exporter (nonmultinational) are 38.8% more productive than non-exporters.

#### Exporters vs Multinationals: Sales

- more export relative to multinational sales if:
  - trade iceberg cost  $(\tau)$  is low
  - fixed FDI cost  $(f_I)$  is high
- empirical evidence:
  - ▶ Helpman et al. (2004) estimate on the same data + subsidiaries in 38 countries:

$$\ln \frac{S_{jk}^X}{S_{jk}^I} = \alpha_k + \alpha_1 \ln FP_j + \beta_1 \ln FREIGHT_{jk} + \beta_2 \ln TARIFF_{jk} + \gamma Z_j + \varepsilon_{jk}$$

- \*  $S_{jk}^X$  = sales in sector j in country k by export
- \*  $S_{jk}^{I}$  = sales in sector j in country k by subsidiaries (FDI)
- \*  $\vec{FP_j}$  = plant-level fixed costs in sector j (represents  $f_I$ )
- \* FREIGHT = transport costs to country k (represents  $\tau$ )
- \*  $TARIFF = tariff rate for sector j in country k (represents <math>\tau$ )

★ 
$$Z = \text{controls}$$

#### Exporters vs Multinationals: Sales

Narrow sample ( $N = 961$ )							
	U.S. std. dev.	Europe std. dev.	France std. dev.	Europe reg. coeff.	France reg. coeff.		
FREIGHT	-1.040 (-7.392)	-0.959 (-6.749)	-1.019 (-7.328)	-0.935 (-6.526)	-0.944 (-6.594)		
TARIFF	-0.365 (-2.644)	-0.512 (-3.636)	-0.421 (-3.917)	-0.545	-0.539 (-3.775)		
FP	1.177 (10.159)	0.932 (7.827)	0.927 (8.059)	0.947 (7.453)	0.934 (7.450)		
DISPERSE	-2.343 (-8.374)	-2.153 (-5.250)	-2.061 (-6.664)	-1.503 (-4.535)	-1.491 (-4.470)		
KL	-0.868 (-7.790)	-0.495 (-4.529)	-0.456 (-4.256)	-0.628 (-5.876)	-0.626 (-5.859)		
RD	-0.104 (-2.197)	0.007 (0.150)	0.007 (0.144)	0.006 (0.125)	-0.002 (-0.047)		
$R^2$	0.373	0.340	0.364	0.332	0.334		

TABLE 3-EXPORTS VERSUS FDI

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- multinationals (MNCs) do not see FDI only as a substitute of trade!
- vertical FDI: firms move part of the production process to another country
- costs & benefits of vertical FDI:
  - fixed cost of setting a subsidiary abroad
  - lower variable production cost
    - $\star\,$  exploit comparative advantage
- we extend Melitz model to analyze the choice of vertical FDI

#### Multinationals and Vertical FDI: Costs

- same set-up with heterogeneous firms, but different technology:
- production requires
  - $1 \beta$  share of "headquarters" tasks (e.g., R& D, marketing, design, etc.)
    - $\star\,$  can be performed only in the headquarters in the North with local labor (wage  $w_N=1)$
  - $\beta$  share of manual production tasks
    - \* can be performed also in a subsidiary in the South with local labor (wage  $w_S < 1$ )
    - $\star\,$  sometimes, we also thing that we have to send the task "back" to the headquarters, cost is  $\tau \times w_S$
  - marginal cost of producing in North (N) vs South (S):

$$MC_N = rac{w_N^{1-eta} w_N^eta}{arphi}$$
 vs  $MC_S = rac{w_N^{1-eta} w_S^eta}{arphi}$ 

#### Multinationals and Vertical FDI: Costs

- Fixed cost of producing North  $f_N$  and (partially) in South  $f_S$ :  $f_S > f_N$
- Total cost of one unit of q, if produced only in North (taking  $w_N = 1$ ):

$$TC_N = \left(q\frac{w_N^{1-\beta}w_N^{\beta}}{\varphi} + f_N w_N\right) = \left(\frac{q}{\varphi} + f_N\right)$$

• Total cost of one unit of q, if production is partially in South (taking  $w_N = 1$ ):

$$TC_S = \left(q\frac{w_N^{1-\beta}w_S^{\beta}}{\varphi} + f_S w_N\right) = \left(q\frac{w_S^{\beta}}{\varphi} + f_S\right)$$

- where  $\beta \in (0,1) = {\rm share} \mbox{ of physical production cost in variable cost}$ 

#### Multinationals and Vertical FDI

- trade-off between variable and fixed cost
  - profits N vs S:

$$\pi_N = A arphi^{lpha/(1-lpha)} - f_N$$
 vs  $\pi_S = A (arphi/w_S^eta)^{lpha/(1-lpha)} - f_S$ 

- firms choose FDI if it saves in variable cost more than in fixed cost
- chooses vertical FDI if:  $\pi_S > \pi_N$
- we can find a cutoff such that if  $\varphi > \varphi_{VI}^*$  do it FDI:  $\pi_S(\varphi_{VI}^*) = \pi_N(\varphi_{VI}^*)$ .

$$A(\varphi_{VI}^*)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} \left( w_S^{-\beta\alpha/(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right) = f_S - f_N$$

- multinationals are more productive  $(\varphi > \varphi_{VI}^*)$ .

$$A(\varphi_{VI}^*)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} \left( w_S^{-\beta\alpha/(1-\alpha)} - 1 \right) = f_S - f_N$$

- $\bullet$  vertical FDI more likely  $(\varphi_{VI}^{*}\downarrow)$  if
  - comparative advantage is strong (low  $w_S$ )
  - set-up cost abroad is relatively low (low  $f_S f_N$  )
  - share of variable cost in production cost is high (high  $\beta$ )

#### Vertical FDI: cutoff



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## Offshoring, FDI and Licensing/Outsourcing

- previously, we discussed the location decision:
  - the decision to produce in the home country or in the foreign country when the parent firm owns the affiliate
- instead the domestic firm could write a contract with a foreign firm
- this is the internalization decision
- The firm can decide to externalize the decision:
  - licensing (instead of horizontal FDI)
  - outsourcing (instead of vertical FDI)

# Offshoring: FDI vs Licensing/Outsourcing

- how to choose licensing vs horizontal FDI? trade-off
  - save in fixed production cost
  - risk of imitation/loss of exclusive technology
  - in general, risk overweighs cost saving
    - $\star$  we observe little licensing
    - ★ risk of imitation/loss of exclusive technology
- how to choose outsourcing vs vertical FDI? trade-off
  - cost saving: foreign providers can specialize and serve more customers (economies of scale)
  - critical factors/processes: more likely costly ex-post renegotiation with the provider (hold-up problem)

- Note: offshoring = acquiring intermediate goods and/or services from abroad
- offshoring groups together both outsourcing and vertical FDI
  - trade in intermediate goods = 40% of world trade in manufacturing
- Few firms do licensing, but the decision of outsourcing vs vertical FDI is challenging
- Seems to be highly sector dependent
  - ▶ lot of FDI in sectors with high capital and R&D intensity
  - Iot of outsourcing in textiles, accessories, shoes...

- Multinationals are larger and more productive than usual exporters
- We extended the Melitz model to account for this regularity
- The model predicts that large firms do more horizontal and vertical FDI
  - Determinants of horizontal FDI: transportation costs/tariffs and fixed cost of production in the foreign country
  - Determinants of vertical FDI: differences of factor price  $(w_S)$ , technology  $(\beta)$  and the fixed cost of production in the foreign country